

P 030850Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3148
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003360

FOR S/CT REAP AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PTER SA](#)

SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 217248

11. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS IN
REFTEL:

A) DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF
EACH COUNTRY TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR
SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 2000,
INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO
TERRORISM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
HOST COUNTRY ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE
KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 THAT KILLED 19
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE SAG HAS PUBLICLY STATED
THAT IT IS STILL LOOKING FOR THREE SAUDI SUSPECTS
LINKED TO THE BOMBING. THE THREE ARE WANTED FOR
QUESTIONING AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE
KINGDOM. THE SAG IS STILL HOLDING A NUMBER OF SAUDI
CITIZENS IN DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING,
INCLUDING SAUDI CITIZEN HANI AL-SAYEGH. CANADIAN
AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AL-SAYEGH IN 1997 ON CHARGES OF
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING AND DEPORTED HIM TO THE
UNITED STATES. SAUDI AUTHORITIES THEN REQUESTED HIS
RENDITION TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND AFTER A LENGTHY REVIEW
THE UNITED STATES RETURNED HIM TO SAUDI ARABIA IN
11999. NO PROSECUTION OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION
BEGAN IN 2000 REGARDING THE BOMBING. SAUDI
AUTHORITIES ARE INVESTIGATING AN AUGUST SHOOTING BY A
LONE SAUDI GUNMAN WHO FIRED AT CARS CARRYING AMERICAN
AND BRITISH CITIZENS OUTSIDE OF THEIR RESIDENTIAL
COMPOUND IN KHAMIS MUSHAYT. A SAUDI GUARD WAS KILLED
IN THE ATTACK, WHILE THE GUNMAN AND TWO SAUDI GUARDS
WERE WOUNDED. NONE OF THE AMERICANS OR BRITISH
CITIZENS HAD SIGNIFICANT INJURIES. SAUDI AUTHORITIES
ALSO RESPONDED TO TWO HIJACKINGS. IN SEPTEMBER,
AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AN IRAQI MAN WHO HIJACKED A QATAR
AIR FLIGHT FROM QATAR TO JORDAN AND FORCED IT TO LAND
IN THE NORTHERN SAUDI TOWN OF HA'IL. THE SAG RETURNED
THE HIJACKER AND PASSENGERS TO QATAR. IN OCTOBER, TWO
SAUDI MEN FORCED A SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT FROM
JEDDAH TO LONDON TO LAND IN IRAQ. IRAQI AUTHORITIES
DETAINED THE HIJACKERS AND RETURNED THE PASSENGERS AND
AIRCRAFT TO JEDDAH. IRAQ DENIED AN EXTRADITION
REQUEST BY THE SAG. NO ONE WAS HARMED IN EITHER
HIJACKING. SAUDI AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO INVESTIGATING
TWO CAR BOMBINGS IN RIYADH IN NOVEMBER IN WHICH ONE
BRITISH CITIZEN WAS KILLED AND SEVERAL WERE INJURED.
AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT DETERMINED WHETHER THE MOTIVE OF
THE BOMBINGS WAS CRIMINAL OR POLITICAL.

B) DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION
DURING THE YEAR? PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN
TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS FOR
EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT IRAQ EXTRADITE TWO
SAUDI MEN WHO HIJACKED A SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES PLANE
FROM JEDDAH TO BAGHDAD. IRAQ DENIED THE REQUEST.
SAUDI AUTHORITIES RETURNED AN IRAQI MAN TO QATAR WHO
HIJACKED A JORDAN-BOUND PLANE FROM QATAR TO HA'IL,
SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON
THE TALEBAN TO EXPEL USAMA BIN LADEN FROM AFGHAN

TERRITORY SO THAT HE MAY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.

C) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S PROSECUTION OF PEOPLE ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS FEW EXTRADITION TREATIES OUTSIDE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL (OIC) AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE LEAGUE'S ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT, WHICH SAUDI ARABIA HAS RATIFIED, CONTAINS EXTRADITION ARTICLES.

D) DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.

RESPONSE: IN MAY THE SAG SIGNED A TREATY WITH MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL (OIC) TO COOPERATE IN COMBATING TERRORISM. AT A SIGNING CEREMONY, A SAG REPRESENTATIVE DECLARED THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF SAUDI ARABIA TO FIGHT ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM. THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, SENIOR ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMN TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY REFUTING IDEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM.

E) DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 2000 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.

F) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT POLITICALLY OR FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES. ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE CONSISTENTLY ENFORCED. THERE CONTINUE TO BE ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT FUNDS FROM PRIVATE CITIZENS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

G) HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? (THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND SUDAN.)

RESPONSE: THE SAG MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST

REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE.

H) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1999, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE?

RESPONSE: THE ATTITUDE OF THE SAG TOWARD TERRORISM DID NOT CHANGE DURING 1999.

I) DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR SPECIFIC COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

RESPONSE: FOLLOWING A 1995 BOMBING THAT KILLED U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ADVISING THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD (OPM/SANG), A USG INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM VISITED SAUDI ARABIA TO BEGIN UNPRECEDENTED, COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE USG AND SAG ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES. THIS COOPERATION, WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES, HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 2000. THE USG AND SAG CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE REGION. CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED. U.S. AND SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE MET IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE TRANS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USG AND SAG INCREASED FURTHER AFTER THE 1998 EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. THE FBI COORDINATES ITS INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY.

J) IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON:

(I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACT; AND

(II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS, ALTHOUGH EARLY COOPERATION WAS NOT AT THE LEVEL EXPECTED BY USG OFFICIALS. SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON MANY INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONSULT CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR BOMBING INVESTIGATION.

(II) THE SAG CONTINUES TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS, AND THREATS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY, CONSULATES AND OTHER U.S. INTERESTS IN 2000. IT MADE AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN

AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL. THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY. THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL IN AN ONGOING EFFORT TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN. USG AND SAG OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

K) IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM. REPORTED THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE DETERRENTS.

BRAYSHAW